




“It is said, melody is merely a succession of sounds. No doubt. And drawing is only an arrangement of colors. An 




In ancient myths of music, melody often takes second place to harmony. The story of 
Pan’s duel with Apollo, the god of music, established this hierarchy through unequal 
participants, but also planted a seed of doubt through a disagreement over the duel’s 
outcome. After speaking poorly of Apollo’s gift, Pan was summoned to a competition 
between his monophonic pipes and Apollo’s multi-stringed lyre. This was to be judged 
by the old mountain god, Timolus. While Pan’s wild melody coaxed and charmed the 
animals, Apollo’s ‘skillful thumb’ brought forth such ‘sweetness’ from his strings that 
the sound won over all listeners but one.2 King Midas defiantly disagreed with Timolus’ 
judgment, upon which—so the tale goes—Apollo promptly transformed Midas’ ears into 
those of an ass. Figure 1 shows Jean Matheus’ seventeenth-century engraving, which 
captures the scene, depicting hands raised, symbolically, in protest and power. While 
the tale scarcely conceals an official criticism of poetic form in which the bucolic is 
outranked by the lyric, it also offers license for a dissenting view of melody.  For 
Midas’s pleasure in Pan’s melody, so shamefully written into his visage, establishes a 
precedent for defying the hierarchy of a cosmic harmony, for prioritizing melody as an 
autonomous form.   
 
[figure 1 near here] 
 
As a fundamental concept in Western musical thought, melody connotes the form and 
affective power of successive sounds (typically, single-pitch) in motion, perceived as an 
aesthetic unity. Typically, single-pitch sounds. Within the common practice period, its 
power of expressive shaping forms the focal point for listeners attuned to the top of a 
musical texture, that which seizes our attention, and whose character-defining contours 
most readily hook our sympathies and understanding. As an unfolding linear structure, 
it is also the compositional parameter that most closely mirrors our experience of finite 
duration, with all the allusive value this has for the nature of transient experience, sonic 
decay, expiring breath, and the impermanence of living matter. (Pan’s very instrument, 
Syrinx, was created from a nymph of the same name who had fatally metamorphosed 
into reeds to escape his advances.) Given this lofty profile, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that within the Humanities melody has enjoyed great currency as a literary metaphor 
and emblem of attainment. Within music theoretical writing more specifically, 
however, the nature and hierarchy of its constitutive, organizing materials remains 
contested, and has provoked vigorous, occasionally legally consequential, argument. 
Needless to say, its status as such is high within Western aesthetics.  
 
																																																								
1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau / J. G. Herder, On the Origins of Language: Two Essays, trans. John H. Moran and 
Alexander Gode (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 53. 
2 Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. and ed. Charles Martin (New York and London: Norton, 2010), 294.  
	 2	
While melodic material has existed for millennia (and a rich melodic tradition in 
historical “folk” and vernacular musics must be presumed largely undocumented), this 
flowering of concept only occurred over the last three centuries, and writing since that 
time—both specialist and non-specialist—is replete with paeans to melody as the 
centerpiece of musical experience. The first major Western treatise devoted to melody, 
Johann Mattheson’s Kern melodischer Wissenschaft, set the tone: ‘the art of composing a 
good melody encompasses what is most essential in the whole of music.’3 The 
sentiment would be echoed in composition treatises later in the century, where J. G. 
Sulzer (1774) declared melody ‘the most essential element of a piece of music,’4 and 
Michel Chabnon (1785) identifies it more particularly as music’s ‘main driver and most 
effective agent, that which gives [music] form, movement and life.’5 By the 
Gefühlsaesthetik of the early 19th century, Anton Reicha could posit melody as nothing 
less than ‘the language of feeling’ itself, while E. T. A. Hoffmann, poeticizing melody’s 
affective power, vaunted it as ‘the primary and most exquisite thing in music, that 
which grasps human sensibility with wonderful magical power.’6 Within this genealogy 
of arch-advocates, it fell to Richard Wagner to epitomize a totalizing position whereby 
the concept becomes synonymous with music’s capacity to express. ‘Music’s only form 
is melody,’ he argued in Oper und Drama (1851), ‘it is not even conceivable without 
melody.’7 Even at this stage, Wagner’s sentiment—like Mattheson’s in 1737—set a trend 
that saw the magnitude of the concept expand further: writing in 1864, the Leipzig 
Kantor Moritz Hauptman lauded melody as ‘the alpha and omega of music,’8 while in 
1899, pedagogue Salomon Jadassohn iterated the point to students using the language 
of the classroom: ‘To composition there belong three elements: first melody, then again 
melody, and now finally, for the third time, melody.’9 
 
There is a certainty about the discursive object in the above accounts. That is to say, 
each writer is confident in their reference. Ostensibly, then, melody ought to be 
relatively unambiguous: you know one when you hear one (adapting Thomas Aquinas’s 
verdict on the concept of ‘time’, or Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart on 
																																																								
3 ‘Diese Kunst, eine gute Melodie zu machen, begreifft das wesentlichste in der ganzen Music’ J. 
Mattheson, Kern melodischer Wissenschaft (Hamburg: Christian Herold, 1737), 29. 
4 ‘Sie ist das Wesentliche des Tonstüks.’ J. G. Sulzer, Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste (Leipzig: 
Wiedmann 1779), 3: 219. 
5 ‘[L]a mélodie est, en Musique, le principal ouvrier, l’argent le plus efficace. C’est elle qui donne les 
formes, le movement & la vie.’ Michel Paul Guy de Chabanon, De la Musique considérée en elle-même et 
dans ses rapports avec la parole, les langues, la poésie et le théâtre (Paris: Pissot, 1785), 29. 
6 Anton Reicha, Treatise on Melody, trans. Peter M. Landey (Hillsdale, NY: Pendragon Press, 2000), 13. 
Hoffmann: ‘Das Erste und Vorzüglichste in der Musik, welches mit wunderbarer Zauberkraft das 
menschliche Gemüt ergreift, ist die Melodie.’ E. T. A. Hoffmann, ‘Über einen Ausspruch Sacchini’s un 
über den sogenannten Effekt in der Musik,’ Fantasiestücke un Callot’s Manier [1814], in E. T. A. Hoffmann: 
Poetische Werke, 6 vols. (Berlin: Aufbau, 1983), 1: 452.   
7 Richard Wagner, Sämtliche Schriften und Dichtungen, 16 vols., (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1911 [vols. 1-
12], 1914 [vols. 13-16]), 7: 125. Cf. Prose Works, trans. W. A. Ellis, 8 vols. (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 3: 333. 
8 Moritz Hauptmann to Carl Kossmaly, 9 September 1864, Leipzig, in The Letters of a Leipzig Cantor, 
trans. A. D. Coleridge (London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1892), 2: 249. 
9 ‘Zum komponieren gehören drei Dingen: zuerst Melodie, dann nochmal Melodie und dann nun 
schließlich zum dritten Male Melodie.’ Cited in Ferruccio Busoni, Wesen und Einheit der Musik (Berlin: 
Hesse, 1956), 48.   
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‘obscenity’).10 To look at the English Hymnal of 1906, or the corpus of Bellinian 
operas,  one would be forgiven for thinking such narrow bands of repertoire would be 
one way to begin substantiating such a case. The reassurance of common assumption is 
not borne out in the history of theoretical writing on melody, however. Johann 
Christian Heinichen touched on this point in his treatise on figured bass in 1711 when 
he protested that: ‘[a] musician is certainly unable to say what melody may be. There is 
a great difference, though, between entirely grasping something and thoroughly 
describing it,’ adding: ‘[a] confused picture will not do when teaching.’11 Heinichen’s 
statement goes to the heart of the matter I want to address: melody has an identity 
problem.  
 
Perhaps this ‘confused picture’ is just what we receive from that chestnut of theory 
pedagogy, the Prelude No. 1 in C major from J. S. Bach’s WTC book 1. Here, the 
physically comfortable arpeggiation of an underlying bass progression forms, for Joel 
Lester, the archetypal ‘pattern-prelude’ in which the overall coherence depends not on 
melodic material, but on ‘underlying harmonies and [contrapuntal] voice leading.’12 In 
such a reading, the improvisational idiom and regular sixteenths conspire to create the 
very definition of harmonic rhythm, a model accompaniment, and it is indicative that 
Charles Gounod, composing in an age closer to Hoffmann than Mattheson, was only 
the first who saw fit to improvise a melody above it, as though one were somehow 
lacking.13  
 
For Ernst Kurth in 1917, Bach’s monophonic lines—even in pieces that ‘appear to 
consist only in harmonic outlines’—have the goal of ‘evoking the impression of 
polyphony’ by alluding to accessory voices within the single line.14 While such 
‘profoundly concealed subtleties’ resist systematic explication, they typically become 
audible through apex or accented pitches, implied melodic dissonances, and the 
counterpointing of melodic continuities in distinct registers, often through sequential 
passagework. Such latent polyphony—later dubbed melodic fission15—‘suggests an aural 
comprehension and supplementation of musical procedures,’ Kurth concludes. Like 
the famed optical illusions in which a single picture appears as a rabbit or a duck, an 
old or a young woman, depending on how you look at it, Bach’s Prelude might be seen 
as temporally unfolding chords (undoubtedly its chief identity) or as a monophonic 
melody based on a principle of sustained arpeggiation. In light of Gounod’s melodic 
																																																								
10 See Stewart’s judgment of Jacobellis vs Ohio (1964), in which he spoke about a threshold test for 
obscenity. This is critiqued in Paul Gewirtz, ‘On “I know it when I see it.”’ Yale Law Review 105 (1996): 
1023-47. 
11 Cited in Mattheson Kern melodischer Wissenschaft, 34 fn. 
12 Joel Lester, Bach’s Works for Solo Violin: Style, Structure, Performance (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 27. 
13 Gounod’s Méditation sur le Premier Prélude de Piano de S. Bach (1852) allegedly resulted from his 
improvisation at the piano, and was notated by his father-in-law, Pierre-Joseph Zimmermann. Copycat 
descant melodies were applied to this and other ‘incomplete’ Preludes by Carl Kossmaly, Ferdinand 
Gumbert, Gustav Graben-Hoffmann, Mario Castelnuovo-Tedesco, Ignaz Moscheles, August Gottfried 
Ritter, and Johann Joseph Abert. On this topic see Georg Feder, ‘Gounods Méditation und ihre Folgen,’ 
in Die Ausbreitung des Historismus uber die Musik (Regensburg: Gustav Bosse, 1969), 85-122.  
14 Ernst Kurth, Ernst Kurth: Selected Writings, trans. And ed. Lee A. Rothfarb (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), 76-77. 
15 The term is Walter Piston’s, see Counterpoint (New York: Norton, 1947). See also W. J. Dowling, ‘The 
perception of interleaved melodies,’ Cognitive Psychology 5 (1973): 322-337. 
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ghosting (wherein no sixteenths are sustained), the sounding effect somehow meets in 
the middle, and the categorical distinction—melody or chord—becomes punctilious.   
 
As Kurth argues, we may silently hear unwritten melodic lines such as Gounod’s, 
prompted by underlying voice-leading, as a natural consequence of active listening, just 
as we may supply harmonic coherence for melodies deemed insufficiently harmonized 
(as Schumann did for Bach’s works for solo violin and cello). Such instances of 
soliciting completion by the auditor arguably emerge from tension between abstract 
structure and sensuous realization, and merely constitute cases of individuals ‘recording 
as composers what they had experienced as unusually active listeners,’ as Edward T. 
Cone once suggested.16  
 
This is literally the case in an episode from Schumann’s Humoreske (1839), in which a 
third stave inserted between the pianist’s two hands contains a melodic line that is 
neither to be played nor specifically imagined during performance. It is embodied in 
the outer parts ‘as a kind of after-resonance,’ observes Charles Rosen. ‘It has its being 
within the mind and its existence only through its echo.’17 Is Bach’s melody missing in 
quite the manner of Schumann’s virtual melody? It is telling that commentators seem 
unable to decide. ‘The [Prelude’s] melody is not always inscribed recognizably for the 
eye,’ Jadasson chides in 1899, ‘but the ear feels it. We hear the melody in the peaks of 
the arpeggiated chords. … Every understanding performer would know here to 
subordinate the accompanying harmony.’18 Example 1 shows the close correlation 
between Gounod’s applied melody and Jadasson’s voice-leading wherein square boxes 
indicate shared pitches. Given the correlation, this seemingly amounts to the same 
thing, where Gounod is merely elaborating as a descant the upper line Jadassohn 
identified, thereby externalizing what Kurth called Bach’s curvilinear intensifications 
[Kurvensteigerungen]. Phenomenologically speaking, then, the ‘melody’ is present in the 
Prelude’s structure, but it seemingly relies on external agents for realization, whether 
listeners or performer. 
 
[EX. 1 & 2 near here]  
 
The same argument might be made for the Largo of Chopin’s Sonata Op. 58 (1844), 
given in example 2. Here—unlike the tradition of sequential harmonic arpeggiation in 
sonata developments (such as Beethoven’s Op. 58i, Op. 2 no. 3i etc.)—a twice-recurring 
chordal arpeggiation is pregnant with melodic impetus, yet no line emerges to 
dominate attention. Whereas Schumann supplied an absent melody, Chopin resolutely 
delineates a tonic arpeggio, as though relishing the absence of melodic focus between 
the movement’s more traditionally melodic outer sections: the RH eighth notes are 
weighted with calculated metrical accents to project the triad, and the peak pitches 
gently elaborate an E-major arpeggio (b—b—b—c#—b—g#—g#—e—e—d#—c#—B—B—A—G#) 
																																																								
16 Edward T. Cone, Hearing and Knowing Music, ed. Robert Morgan (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2009), 33. 
17 Charles Rosen, The Romantic Generation (London: Fontana, 1999), 8-9. 
18 ‘Nicht immer ist die Melodie für das Auge erkennbar gezeichnet; das Ohr empfindet sie jedoch. Wir 
hören die Melodie in den Spitzen der arpeggierten Accorde … jeder verständige Spieler würde hier die 
begleitende Harmonie der Melodie … unterzuordnen wissen.’ Salomon Jadassohn, Das Wesen der Melodie 
(Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1899), 1-2. 
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in a texture whose role seemingly is to project E major resonance against momentary 
inflections.  
 
The above comparison of repertoire in which melody may be actual, implied or virtual 
begins to substantiate Heinichen’s belief that while musicians cannot say what melody 
is, they grasp it. To this I would add a continuation: that they seldom agree on it. It is 
partly this condition of personal ownership that has undermined attempts to theorize 
melody beyond narrowly confined bands of repertoire. As successive pedagogical 
treatises acknowledged, melody turns out to be something of a slippery conceptual 
problem, forever flitting between definitions and local schemes of taste and identity. By 
the mid-19th century, the lack of consensus was itself an old story: ‘Let’s leave aside for 
once the misused, even equivocal expression “Melody,”’ the critic Ludwig Bischoff 
demurs. ‘Melody or no melody: we don’t want to argue about that.’19 By the early 20th, 
art historian Oscar Bie simply admitted defeat, confessing that ‘every definition 
falsifies.’20 A durable, strict definition has indeed proven elusive, creating something of 
a moving target for writers and composers who sought to engage the concept for the 
purposes of recording or imparting musical knowledge. Even steeled with all the 
armament of tonal and post-tonal theory, the problem remained intractable well into 
the 20th century, it seems. And it is indicative that even after detailed illustration of 
Mozart’s G minor symphony for CBS in 1962 Leonard Bernstein, asking what melody 




One reason for this enduring ambiguity is that the simplest definition of ‘melody’ 
advanced over the last three centuries—a linear succession of discrete pitches in time—
has proven both too broad and too narrow: it could be a definition of music itself, but 
neglects telling details of style, shape, and patterning, not to mention expression and—
since the mid-18th-century—putative relations to aesthetics. In other words, all the 
parameters that concern the phenomenological experience of sounds connected 
successively in time.  
 
Another reason is that theories of melody inherently refer back to the judgment of a 
listening subject. This element of particularism, with its focus on unquantifiable factors 
of individual experience, renders the topic more resistant that most to traditional 
epistemological schemes such as Dahlhaus’ three paradigms for the history of theory, or 
the broader schema of Foucauldian épistèmes.22 Approaches to ‘melody,’ conceived as 
an elusive, forever ill-defined concept, thus rely on the elective tracing of common 
discursive threads, and on historical comparison of nascent methods and their 
																																																								
19 ‘Lassen wir einmal den durch Missbrauch allerdings zweideutig gewordenen ausdruck “Melodie.” 
Melodie oder nicht Melodie: darüber wollen wir nicht straiten.’ in Ludwig Bischoff, ‘Richard Wagner’s 
Lohengrin,’ Niederrheinische Musik-Zeitung 38 (1858): 300. 
20 Oscar Bie, “Melody,” trans. Theodor Baker, Musical Quarterly 2 (1916): 402-17, here 402. 
21 Leonard Bernstein gave a series “Young People’s Concerts” for CBS between 1958-72. This comment 
concludes the 21st broadcast on 21 December 1962, See 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O09V4NQkOKI [accessed 4 January 2015]. 
22 Dahlhaus, Die Musiktheorie im 18. Und 19. Jahrhundert: Grundzüge einer Systematik. 2 vols. (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftlich Buchgesellschaft, 1989), 1: 6-9. 
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attendant commentaries. In this, though, the concept remains ensnared within a 
tension Nicholas Cook identifies between theory and epistemic self-awareness: ‘when 
theorists are confident of the epistemological status of their work they will say nothing 
about it, whereas when they do talk about it we can deduce they are not quite sure 
about what they are saying.’23 The evidence indicates that ‘melody’ remains in 
permanent transition from the first category to the second, which helps explain why 
each theorist to write on the subject professed to being the first who dared to do so. 
Earlier attempts, if known, belonged to a moribund past. ‘The lack of continuity 
provokes astonishment when one considers the development of the theory of 
counterpoint and of harmony,’ Dahlhaus comments, qualifying that teaching of 
harmony ‘disappoints’ in its scope and limitation; that is, its ‘almost unbroken 
continuity’ is measured unequally to that of melody.24 
 
Historical Changes 
A brief overview of the historical emergence of the concept of melody as a musical line 
offers some perspective on the matter. The earliest Western writings on the concept 
‘melos,’ from Cleonides’s account of Aristoxenus to Aristotle and Aristides 
Quintilianus, differ in their discussion of four species of relative motion between 
sounds (sequence, succession, repetition, prolongation), but broadly insert the 
patterning of such motion within a strict musical typology that governs the properties 
of ‘melic’ movement (ode, dirge, hymn, paean, dithyramb). Here, Plato’s definition has 
come to hold sway: ‘melos’ referred to nothing less than music conceived as a 
performing art.25 It centers on the conjoined entity of word, harmony and tempo / 
dance / movement that properly characterizes what Aristides Quintilianus calls ‘perfect 
melos’. In other words, music wherein: 
 
it is necessary that melody, rhythm, and diction be considered so that the perfection of the song 
may be produced: in the case of melody, simply a certain sound; in case of rhythm, the motion of 
sound; and in the case of diction, the meter. The things contingent to perfect melos are 
motion—both of sounds and body—and also chronoi and the rhythms based on these.26 
 
Here melos appears to constitute nothing less than organized sound (‘a certain sound’), 
and, as such, offers a totalizing view of music’s organizing matter between the teachings 
of Aristotle and Aristides Quintialianus (ca. 480 BC and 300 AD).27 Writing a hundred 
years thereafter, St. Augustine arguably engages the issue when he asks: ‘who can 
mentally perceive so subtle a thing as to be able to distinguish without great labour how 
sound may be prior to melody?’ He answers: ‘melody is formed sound … [and] matter is 
prior to what is made out of it … When it is sung, its sound is heard, for there is not 
first a formless sound that is afterwards formed into a melody.’28 This critique of 
																																																								
23 Nicholas Cook, ‘Epistemologies of music theory,’ The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory [2002], 
ed. Thomas Christensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 78. 
24 ‘Der Mangel an Kontinuität mag erstaunen hervorrufen, wenn man an die Entwicklung der 
Kontrapunkttheorie und der Harmonielehre denkt.’ Dahlhaus and Abraham, Melodielehre, 16-17. 
25 Plato, Republic III: 398 d:  
26 Cited in T. J. Mathiesen, Apollo’s Lyre: Greek Music and Music Theory in Antiquiry and the Middle Ages  
(Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 25. Emphasis added. Chronoi are units of 
time that constitute metre. 
27 While melopoeia (Greek: ‘song making’) refers more specifically, by relation to onomatopoeia, to the 
melodic line of the verses in Greek tragedy, the later problem of a specific identity are latent here.   
28 Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. John Ryan (New York: Image Books, 1960), 298-99. 
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Genesis (‘the earth was without form and void’) sees the matter of sounding as prior in 
origin to the form of singing, but prior neither in time nor in choice; as such, it adds a 
philosophical ground for later debates over the identity of melody and its origin as a 
form.  
 
Despite the vast body of medieval chant that bears witness to the praxis of melodic 
singing,29  melody was only defined as a linear pitch structure in the late 16th century, 
amid the prestige and quantitative predominance of sacred polyphony within European 
cultural centers. In order to differentiate a single voice of successive pitches from a 
polyphonic texture, Friedrich Beurhusius argued in his Erotematum musicae of 1573 that 
‘melodia’—melody’s Latin cognate—had two meanings: ‘cantus conjunctus’ was vocal 
music whose melody flows through several connected hexachords within a system of 
notation (i.e. using multiple vocal ranges), and ‘cantus simplex’ was vocal music whose 
melody moves within the hexachordal range of a single voice.30   
 
From this schism, the nascent definition of melody begins to solidify around 1599 with 
Joachim Burmeister, who posits melodia, still a succession of notes in a single voice, as 
an integral component of the syntactical structure of musica poetica: 
 
A melody is the bringing about of sounds which follow one another by means of the raising and 
lowering of successive intervals, constituting a species of harmony, i.e. a single voice which when 
sung touches the sense in its own way, so that in a not obviously unmusical person the effects it 
creates are felt.31   
 
Later the ordered sequence of pitches is cleanly contradistinguished from harmony, to 
which melody remains bound during polyphony: 
 
																																																								
29 The body of western liturgical chant bears witness to the fact that monophonic vocal melody exists in 
ritualized practice from at least the 4th century AD onward.  The extent to which singers and scholars in 
Benvento or Aquitaine conceived of these chants as autonomous linear pitch structures in parallel to the 
liturgical texts is unknowable. But applying the label ‘melody’ to them in this sense has arguably less to 
do with the intentional fallacy than the extent to which they relate to the four by two matrix of modes as 
a means of organizing the gamut of available tonal space (and the enduring debates over whether such a 
scheme, codified centuries later, was ‘real’). Cf. Harold Powers, ‘Is Mode Real: Pietro Aron, the Octenary 
System, and Polyphony,’ Basler Jahrbuch für historische Musikpraxis 16 (1973): 189-239. 
30 ‘What is a simple song? A simple one is one whose melody is inflected through a simple system of one 
order of voices, or at least transcends ‘la' by the space of a second; and it is therefore performed by one 
order of voices, and the note exceeding ‘la’ is expressed by ‘fa’ (as it often is also in conjoined 
songs). What is a conjoined song? A conjoined one is one whose melody proceeds through a system of 
conjoined orders; and it is performed by a permutation of widely ranged voices, especially ‘re’ and ‘la’, 
through the conjunction of those orders of voices.’ [‘Quis simplex Cantus? / Simplex est, cujus melodia 
per simplex unis vocum ordinis systema inflectitur, aut saltem La secundae spacio transcendit: ideoque 
uno vocum ordine exercetur, notaque La excedens per fa (ut etiam saepe in conjunctis) exprimitur,’ and 
‘Quis Cantus Conjunctus? / Conjunctus est cujus Melodia per systema ordinum conjunctorum decurrit: 
Atque is penmutatione extremarum vocum, praesertim re et la, conjunctis illis ordinibus vocum 
exercetur.’]  Friedrich Beurhusius, Erotematum musicae [1573], 2nd ed., Nuremberg, 1580. Facsimile, 
edited by W. Thoene, Cologne, 1961.  
31 ‘Melodia est sonorum aliorum post alios pro ratione elevationis & depressionis intervallorum se 
subsequentium effectio, Harmoniae speciem, videlicet unicam vocem constituens, quae decantata 
sensum suo modo tangit, ut affectus in homine non planè amuso create sentiantur.’ Burmeister, 
Hypomnematum Musicae Poeticae (Rostock: Stephani Myliandri, 1599), Dd 4 f. 
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Melody and harmony are different, in that the latter is a euphony bound together from the 
melodies of a plurality of voices into a harmony; the former is a product of just one voice.32 
 
As Markus Bandur has argued, the principle of melodic monophony, perceived as a 
determinate musical shape, begins to emerge securely by the early 17th century.33 In 
such a conception, ‘melody’ achieved a degree of autonomy as a formal structure, 
requiring neither text nor harmonic accompaniment. For Christian Bernhard, in his 
1660 treatise Tractatus compositionis augmentatus: ‘it can also happen that notes by 
themselves can make a good melody, [but] sound ugly with underlaid text.’34 During 
these decades of early codification, the terms tune, song, notes, Lied, Weise, ‘Thon,’ 
and Stimme, are used freely and interchangeably in Latin dictionaries to define 
‘Cantus’ and ‘Melodia’ in the vernacular.35  It is indicative of the consequential effect 
this had on contemporary understanding that Charles Butler could reverse the 
languages in a discussion of four-part writing that encapsulates the emergent historical 
category in 1636: ‘But heere one of dhe upper Partes is necessarily to have a special 
Melodi aboov the rest: which is called dhe Cantus or Tune: such as may delight a 
Musical ear, dhowgh [i.e. though] it bee sung along by it self.’36 Numerous refinements 
to this basic position are traceable in French, German and British writings,37 but it 
would take a century before the category, in a corresponding definition of melody by J. 
A. Scheibe, could be proposed as fully independent of harmonic accompaniment: ‘a 
natural connectedness of successive simple tones that sound good with and without 
harmony.’38 
 
It was at precisely this time, around 1730, that ‘melody’ attains perhaps its most 
familiar definition as a closed phenomenon, that of a connecting, progressing 
																																																								
32 ‘Melodia & harmonia differunt, eo quod haec sit modulamen, explurium vocum Melodiis in 
harmoniam devinctum; illa unius solum vocis affectio.’ Joachim Burmeister, Hypomnematum Musicae 
Poeticae (Rostock: Stephani Myliandri, 1599), C 4. 
33 Markus Bandur, ‘Melodia / Melodie,’ Handwörterbuch der Musikologische Terminologie, ed. Hans 
Heinrich Eggebrecht and Albert Riethmüller (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1971-2006), 18-19. 
34 ‘Denn es kann sonst geschehen, daß noten, so an sich selbst eine gute Melodie haben, [aber] durch 
Unterlegung des Textes übel lauten.’  Christoph Bernhard, Tractatus compositionis augmentatus: Die 
Kompositionslehre Heinrich Schützens in der Fassung seines Schülers Christoph Bernhard, 2nd ed., (Kassel and 
New York: Bärenreiter, 1963), 40. 
35 The earliest example is Fritsche Closener, whose Glossarum of 1362 defines melodia as ‘Licht oder 
wise,’ in Kirchert and Klein (ed.), die Vokabulare von Fritsche Closener u. Jacob Twinger von Königshofen 
(Tübingen 1995), 2: 892. Further examples include: ‘Art. Cantus: Citharae Cantus … The tune or 
melody,’ Thomas Cooper, Thesaurus Linguae Romanae & Britannicase (London, 1565), 3b; ‘Art. Cantus: A 
song or singer, a tune, sound melodie, or dumpe: a charme, an inchuntment in verses,’ in Thomas 
Thomas, Dictionarium Linguae Latinae et Anglicanae (London 1587).   
36 Charles Butler, The Principles of Musik in Singing and Setting (London: John Haviland, 1636), 45. 
37 Michael Praetorius wrote of melody in 1619 as ‘unicam cantilenae vocem … vel Symphonium.’ And 
Butler of it in 1636, as ‘the sweete modulation or tune of each part in it self.’ See Praetorius, Syntagma 
Mus. III (Wolfenbüttel, 1619), 28; Charles Butler, Principles of Musik, 44. Thereafter, the identity of 
melody as an unaccompanied line is traceable across a range of sources, from Jacques Rousseau (Traité de 
la Viole [Paris 1687]), to Alan Malcolm—‘melody is the Effect only of one single Part’—(A Treatise of Musick 
[Edinburgh 1721], 414; and Roger North—‘Melody is the modulation of one production … harmony is of 
divers’—(The Music Grammarian [1728], rpt Cambridge, 1990, 96).     
38 ‘Die Melodie aber ist ein natürlicher Zusammengang aufeinander folgender einfacher Klänge, welche 
mit und ohne Harmonie wohl klinget.’ J. A. Scheibe, Compendium musices theoretico-practicum, das ist Kurzer 
Begriff derer nötigsten Compositions-Regeln [1730], rpt as supplement to Peter Benary (ed), Die deutsche 
Kompositionslehre des 18. Jahrhunderts  (Breitkopf & Härtel, 1961), 13. Emphasis added. 
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succession of tones, pitches, sounds or intervals that ensound an organic, actively 
unfolding form: ‘the Progression of a Sound proceeding from one Note to another 
successively in a single Part,’ as John Christopher Pepusch put it in his Treatise on 
Harmony (1737).39 Arias from canonical operas by Handel, Hasse and Graun, to name 
but three contemporaries, would seem to offer ready exemplification of this conception 
of self-sufficient melody: texted vocal lines in intimate dialogue with, but timbrally and 
conceptually distinct from the orchestral accompaniment. Yet if we look to the 
keyboard music of the time, specifically the rich tradition of realizing thorough bass 
extempore, this image of a self-sufficient ‘melody’ becomes less clear. And this juncture 
has a claim to be an origin of the identity problem mentioned above.  
 
In his 1711 treatise Heinichen treats melody as a special form of embellishment, i.e. a 
horizontal outgrowth or decoration of harmonic logic. As example 3 shows, he offers 
students a choice on how to realize a simple harmonic accompaniment (ex. 3a): (1) 
divide a rhythmicized accompaniment between the hands (ex. 3b); or (2) take the entire 
accompanimental harmony in the LH, leaving the RH ‘to invent a particular song or 
melody on the bass as good as our imagination, taste, and talent will allow’ (ex. 3c).40 
Here Heinichen appears to invest the concept of melody with a degree of autonomy, 
but locates melodic invention firmly within the grid of a predefined harmonic 
movement.  
 
[EX. 3a-c near here] 
 
We need only look to the Andante of J. S. Bach’s Italian Concerto (1735)—a d-minor 
cantilena (ABA), whose florid, arioso style, above uninterrupted accompanimental 
eighth notes, decorates two cadences (in VI and I)—to see that without a metrical 
container or the finitude of a singer’s breath, the endless spinning of melodic material 
relies on a harmonic syntax of prolongation rather than what we might call melodic 
form, derived from rhythmic periods or phrasal units.  For prominent bassists such as 
Heinichen and Gasparini, such melodies were only warranted during ritornello 
passages or in solo performance, and C. P. E. Bach warns against obfuscating textures 
around them.41 Despite the manifest existence of an operatic repertoire and folksong 
tradition, then, Scheibe’s sense of ‘successive simple sounds that sound good with and 
without harmony’ would seem misleading to the extent the melodic line remains 
subservient to harmonic function within the epistemology of thorough bass.  
Historiographically, the standard bearer for this argument is of course Rameau, who—
																																																								
39 J. C. Pepusch, A Treatise on Harmony  [1730], rpt  (Hildeseim and New York: Georg Olms, 1976): 3. 
40 J. D. Heinrichen, Neu erfundene und gründliche Anweisung … zu vollkommener Erlernung des General-Basses 
[1711], cited and translated in George Buelow, Thorough-Bass Accompaniment according to Johann David 
Heinichen (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966), 171. 
41 ‘Gratuitous passage work and bustling noise do not constitute the beauties of accompaniment. In fact, 
they can easily do harm to the principal part by robbing it of its freedom to introduce variations into 
repetitions and elsewhere.  … [The accompanist] need feel no anxiety over his being forgotten if he is not 
constantly joining in the tumult. No! An understanding listener does not easily miss anything. In his 
soul’s perception melody and harmony are inseparable.  Yet, should the opportunity arise and the nature 
of a piece permit it, when the principal part pauses or performs plain notes the accompanist may open 
the draft on his dampened fire.’ C. P. E. Bach, Versuch über die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen, trans and 
ed. W. Mitchell, 2 vols. (New York: Norton, 1949), 367-68. 
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leaning on the dominant acoustic science of his age—makes this argument most clearly 
in the opening sentences of his Traité:  
 
Music is the science of sounds … [and] is generally divided into harmony and melody, but we 
shall show in the following that the latter is merely a part of the former and that a knowledge of 
harmony is sufficient for a complete understanding of all the properties of music.42 
 
The corollary of this position is made explicit when he proceeds to specify how a 
composer selects pitches to compose a melody: ‘once we know the chords each bass 
note should bear, we may choose any of the sounds in each chord so as to form a 
melody to our liking.’43  
 
Melody only exists by implication, then, as a liminal property. If it is merely a halo-
effect of harmony, the suspicion that vocal melody could not function ‘without 
harmony’ raises the question as to whether melody, as a manifest form, ever really 
existed. Looking back from the mid 19th century, Helmholtz’s quasi-ethnographic 
argument that ‘finely cultivated music existed for thousands of years without harmony, 
and still exists today among non-Europeans,’ echoed A. B. Marx in asserting the 
historical primacy of melody. But this relies on an appreciation of overtones, as we shall 
see. And with continuing uncertainty about what melody ‘is,’  the argument buckles 
under the weight of its colonialist context.44 
 
 
Voice: The Children of Rousseau 
One of the most effective opponents of the bassists’ view, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, is also 
the figure chiefly responsible for the longevity of melody as a popular concept. For his 
statements, in both the Lettre sur la musique français (1753) and the Essai sur l'origine des 
langues (1781), were widely read—in part because of the journalistic spats to which they 
gave rise—and bring together the cardinal discourses that would characterize later 
traumas over melodic theory: nationalism; feeling / expression; nature. It would seem 
no coincidence that melody emerges secure in an identity contradistinguished from 
harmony at this juncture, i.e. the moment its glassy fragility—as a decorative extension 
of harmony—is assertively and publicly repudiated.  
 
Unlike thorough bassists concerned with harmony as a science of applied mathematics, 
Rousseau begins from the premise that all melody is fundamentally concerned with 
voice. His rationale is humanist rather than historical: ‘as soon as vocal signs strike your 
ear, they announce to you a being like yourself. They are, so to speak, the voice of the 
soul. If you hear them in the wilderness, they tell you you are not alone.’45 This bond of 
communication underwrites the innateness of melodic expressivity, for him, carving 
out the space for a vocal-melodic epistemology untouchable by reasoning based on the 
overtone series. (This innateness of expression is arguably the basis for later claims—
																																																								
42 Jean-Philippe Rameau, Treatise on Harmony [1722], trans. Philip Gossett (New York: Dover, 1971), 3. 
43 Sevenths need appropriate resolution through voice leading, he continues, indicating that Rameau’s 
principle refers to consonant sounds in the first instance. Rameau, Treatise on Harmony, 321.  
44 Helmholtz, On the Sensations of Tone, vii; Marx, Die alte Musiklehre im Streit in unserer Zeit (Leipzig: 
Breitkopf & Härtel, 1841), 16.  
45 J.-J. Rousseau, The Origins on Language, 63-64. 
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hermeneutic and mimetic—for quasi-semantic melodic meaning, from Arthur 
Schopenhauer who proselytized about intuitive understandings of a melody ‘which says 
a great deal’  as a criterion for natural selection,46 to Reicha, for whom ‘there are good 
and bad melodies, that is, those which express something and those that do not.’47 The 
derivative critic Max Nordau sums up the basic position: ‘melody may be said to be an 
effort of music to say something definite.’)48 Earlier writers had used the term 
‘cantabile’ to refer to both melodic shape and a manner of performance, from Zarlino 
(1558), who refers to ‘[la] perfettione della Figure cantabili,’49 to the title page of J. S. 
Bach’s Inventions and Sinfonias (1723), which seeks ‘eine cantabile Art im Spielen zu 
erlangen.’50 Yet these establish little ground for an ontology of melody. By contrast, 
Rousseau, writing on a platform of historical linguistics, made the decisive claim in 
1781 that melody and voice are intimately linked through the principle of imitation (in 
vogue among European philosophers, after J. J. Winckelmann’s 1764 treatise on 
Classical art declared it a modern necessity): 
 
By imitating the inflections of the voice, melody expresses pity, cries of sorrow and joy, threats 
and groans. All the vocal signs of passion are within its domain. It imitates the tones of 
language, and the twists produced in every idiom by certain psychic acts … [I]t has a hundred 
times the power of speech. This is what gives music its power of representation and song its 
power over sensitive hearts.51 
 
Voice is here invested with the authority of centuries of human development; in the 
Essai’s schema, it forms an invisible bond reaching back to the earliest and most natural 
state of being (where the term première mélodie refers to the melodiousness of the very 
earliest languages), while also witnessing a transition from poetry to prose, figurative to 
conceptual forms of utterance, states of passion to those mediated by reflection. For 
this reason, voice—melody—nature were forged as a crucible of human identity, no less, 
for the Romantic imagination. This bond also laid the ground for 19th-century 
discourses of Sprachmelodie and its compositional outlets, from the satellite genres of 
melodrama to Schoenberg’s Sprechstimme. And we need only look to Herbert Spencer’s 
Origin and Function of Music (1858) for an evolutionist revision of Rousseau’s theory 
wherein sympathetic physiological response to vocal melodic sounds (most palpably 
markers of suffering: screams and cries) ensure we understand the intonation of 
utterances intuitively.   
 
Returning to the Enlightenment, at a local level Rousseau famously invokes Nature in 
his querelle with Rameau to counter similarly lofty claims: that natural laws of acoustic 
science underpin the corps sonore. ‘Nature inspires songs, not accords,’ he corrects, ‘she 
																																																								
46 ‘A significant melody which says a great deal soon makes its way round the entire earth, while one poor 
in meaning which says nothing straightaway fades and dies.’ Arthur Schopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms, 
trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1970), 162. 
47 Reicha, Treatise on Melody, 3. 
48 Max Nordau, Degeneration [1895]. 2nd ed. (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 
200. 
49 G. Zarlino, Le Istitutioni Harmonische (Venice: 1558), 260. 
50 J. S. Bach, New Bach Reader, ed. Hans David and Arthur Mendel, rev. Christoph Wolff (New York and 
London: Norton, 1998), 98. 
51 J.-J. Rousseau, On the Origins of Language, 57.  
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speaks of melody, not harmony.’52 But the occasion tapped into a far deeper association 
with birdsong and folksong, where variegated constructions of the ‘natural’ further 
complicated the establishment of a lasting theory of melody. Consider the range of 
historical definitions of melody linked to concepts of nature, from melody as a natural 
product (Roger North: ‘a sort of musick . . . [that] seems to flow from nature’ [1710]),53 
to melody as a more essential part of nature (David Mollison: ‘this voice of nature’ 
[1798]).54 From here it is only a small step to the hierarchical division of Poiesis into 
inspiration and human toil, in which agent-less minds of composers become the vessels 
through which the external authority of nature is channeled. Melody was centrally 
implicated in the discourse on musical genius in this sense, and Berlioz is representative 
in declaring it simply: ‘a gift of nature.’55   
At the risk of appearing practical and prosaic, such ideas were unhelpful for theorists 
engaged in pedagogy. They failed to engage with familiar, more useable concepts (pitch, 
rhythm, shape, pattern, form etc.); they failed to identify an organizing material for 
melody that could be learned, in other words. They also avoided specifying a hierarchy 
of expressive parameters for students of melody. ‘Why all these authorities anyway?’ 
asked a frustrated Flodoard Geyer, author of a quickly forgotten treatise on 
composition in 1862. ‘For every opinion, even the most absurd, there will always be at 
least one advocate!’56 One zany skeptic declared A.B. Marx a charlatan for seeking, in his 
Compositionslehre, to grow periodic melodies organically from germinal motifs and scale 
formulae. ‘[S]hould [a composer] wish to invent a melody of eight bars, to fit to a long 
or short meter,’ the New York critic exhorts, ‘he will find, at last, that his carefully 
nursed [motivic] germs will forsake him in the hour of necessity, and he will be thrown 
back, musically poverty-stricken, upon his barren Marx again. I speak from 
experience.’57 Ensconced in Berlin, Marx did not reply. 
 
As noted above, Rousseau had identified vocal utterance (its imitation and implied 
heritage) as the organizing material of melodic expression. While later philologists 
revised his arguments about language, it may be no coincidence that, after the age of 
the castrato, a celebrated tradition of Italian melodists—Bellini, Donizetti, Leoncavallo, 
Verdi, Puccini—rested on writing for voice, where new perceptions of operatic realism 
drew opera closer to the manner of a spoken play, with raw cries and sotto voce, 
differentiated vocal characters often dovetailing melodic lines in ensemble, cutting in 
and out of the drama as needed. Bellini’s famous conviction for opera links supple 
poetic forms with an inviolable amalgam of voice and melody in no uncertain terms:  
 
																																																								
52 Ibid., 62. 
53 Cited in Graham Strahle (ed.), An Early Music Dictionary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 8b. 
54 David Mollison, Melody: The Soul of Music (Glasgow: Courier Office, 1798), 17 
55 “C’est un don de la nature.” Berlioz, “De la musique en général I” [1837], Revue et gazette musicale de 
Paris IV (1837), 407a.  
56 “Ueberhaupt, wozu den immer Autoritäten? Für jede Meinung, selbst die absurdeste, wird es immer 
wenigstens einen Gewährsinn geben!” Flodoard Geyer, “Kann und soll die Melodie gelehrt werden?” 
Neue Berliner Musik-Zeitung (October 10, 1860), 322. Emphasis added.  
57 Max Braun, “Max versus Marx: Critical Analysis of A. B. Marx’s ‘Musical Composition’ with 
additional commentary on musical training,” New York Musical World 18 (1857): 567. 
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Carve into your head in adamantine letters: Opera must make people weep, feel horrified, die through 
singing. It’s wrong to want to write all the numbers in the same way, but they must all be 
somehow shaped so as to make the music intelligible through their clarity of expression, at once 
concise and striking.58  
 
Perhaps the most prominent melodic theorist of the 19th century to cultivate the 
ground Rousseau (among others) established was German. As I have written elsewhere, 
Wagner’s mid-century theory of melody posited language rather than music-theoretical 
concepts as its primary material. Moving beyond the principle of imitation, he drew on 
emergent philological studies of phonology to explicate melody, qua musical tone, in 
terms of a vowel-enhanced sounding of poetry that connects concepts through 
alliterated consonants: ‘the redemption of the poet’s endlessly conditioned thought 
into a deep-felt consciousness of emotion’s highest freedom.’59  This idealist definition 
of melody, at first glance a casually abstract gloss, refers quite deliberately to a 
rationalization of the process by which modern melodists were to retrieve the 
communicative power of fossilized units of utterance, whose indivisibility promised – 
for Sanskritists – the origin of all meaning. The slippage between enunciated vowel and 
musical tone links the domains of speech and music at the level of sensation, for 
Wagner, which meant, at the level of ‘truth’ and ‘reality,’ according to his intellectual 
mentor Ludwig Feuerbach.  
 
Perhaps because this theory emerged in the same text as Wagner’s public evisceration of 
Rossini as the ‘murderer’ of modern operatic melody, it spawned a bilious debate that 
saw Wagner labelled as a melodic pretender: a composer who denounced operatic 
melody hitherto, yet placed melody at the center of his worldview, and was himself 
unable to compose melody. Criticism that exceeded personal enmity often cited the 
central role of language as the problem, from skepticism towards Stabreim to suspicions 
of historically retrograde tendencies in opera: 
 
If opera is indeed to be only a succession of recitatives, without a resting point – a mere 
musical intoning of the dramatic dialogue, without any specific musical aim and 
substance . . . Wagner is no reformer, but the most violent artistic reactionary, who 
ignores the progress made since Rameau and Lully, and in a most unpractical way and 
in place of the cultivated dramatic music we have had for eighty years, wants to re-
establish recitative, the exclusive predominance of whose quintessence would form the 
worst monotony.60  
While Wagner resisted what we might call linguistic determinism (the idea that a text 
can be set to music in only one way, according to its constitutive intonation and 
syntax), the fear that he was vacating established ground by replacing metrically 
																																																								
58 John Rosselli, The Life of Bellini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 43. 
59 Richard Wagner, “Oper und Drama,” Sämtliche Schriften und Dichtungen, 4:142. Cf. Prose Works 2: 281. 
60 “Soll die Oper nichts sein, als eine Reihe von Recitativen, ohne Ruhepunct, – eine bloße musikalische 
Betonung der drammatischen Rede, ohne specifisch musikalischen Zweck und Gehalt . . . Wagner ist 
dann kein Reformator, sondern der ärgste Reactionär im Gebiete der Kunst, der die seit Rameau und 
Lully gemachten Fortschritte mißachtet und, höchst unpractischer Weise, an die Stelle der ausgebildeten 
dramatischen Musik, wie wir sie seit achtzig Jahren besitzen, das Recitativ wieder herstellen möchte, 
dessen Alleinherrschaft den Inbegriff ärgster Monotonie bilden würde.” W. M. S., “Lohengrin in Wien,” 
Monatschrift für Theater und Musik (1858), 437.  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governed, harmonically rounded arias with declamatory recitative secured his 
temporary role as the poster boy of Melodielosigkeit.  
 
If we take a broad view of vocal melodic ‘composition,’ it becomes clear that others had 
made claims in the same direction. We might look to Guido d’Arezzo in the early 11th 
century, who developed a formal technique for setting a text to music automatically. 
Each vowel was assigned a pitch, and the melody resulted from the chain of vowels in 
the text.61 Or to Conrad Beissel in the early 18th century, who argued every sentence has 
a unique pitch structure determined by master and slave words.62 Not to mention the 
twin impulses of realism and nationalism that fuelled an international attraction to the 
language-melody axis in the 19th century, from a predominantly German discourse on 
Sprachmelodie, and the slightly later but no less radical concern for a unified French 
language—bolstered by Paul Passy’s phonetic dictionary in 1897—that explains the 
conspicuous display of French speech distinguishing contemporary mélodie,63 to 
Mussorgsky’s musical ideal of ‘the sound of human speech in all its subtlest shadings.’64  
 
 
Objects of instrumental melody 
Whether or not melody relates archeologically to voice, of course, not all melodies are 
actually vocal. Beyond the Rousseauian argument lay the challenge to define an 
alternative constitutive material or organizing principle for instrumental melody. The 
concept of an exclusively instrumental melodic line, non-transferable to texted voices, is 
traceable to the mid-seventeenth century, as noted above. While it would be misleading 
to claim this led to a consensus around the firming opposition of such categories,65 
Schoenberg’s uncontroversial observation that ‘instrumental melodies admit much 
more freedom in every respect than vocal’ raises the question of how this freedom was 
to be governed.66 It proved a deceptively simple question. Answers differ widely among 
theorists of the last three centuries, a sampling of which can be summarized under the 
following categories, conceived both separately and in combination: 
 
• periods / metrical rhythm (Koch; Reicha) 
• intervals / dyads (Mattheson; Marx) 
• rotation and development of figures or motives (Koch; Riepel; Daube; Reicha; 
Marx) 
• imitation of models (Daube; Lobe) 
• overtones (Helmholtz; Hindemith) 
• archetype- and pattern-based expectation (Meyer; Namour)  
• pitch peaks (Koch; Zotan; Jadassohn) 
																																																								
61 See d’Arezzo’s Micrologus de disciplina artis musicae (1025).  
62 See Lloyd George Blakely, “Johann Conrad Beissel and Music of the Ephrata Cloister,” Journal of 
Research in Music Education 15 (1967), 120–38. 
63 Katherine Bergeron, Voice Lessons: French Mélodie in the Belle Epoque (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), x. 
64 Mussorgsky to Ludmilla Shestakova, 30 July 1868, cited in Music in the Western World, ed. Taruskin and 
Weiss (New York: Schirmer, 1984), 395. 
65 Reicha, for one, asserts ‘I do not treat vocal or instrumental melody specifically, but deal with them in 
general, leaving readers free to make applications to the genres of their interest.’ Treatise on Melody, 3. 
66 Arnold Schoenberg, Fundamentals of Musical Composition, ed. Gerald Strang (London: Faber, 1967), 98. 
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• contour, and arch shaping, of a phrase (Schoenberg; Dowling; Polansky & 
Bassein; Huron)67 
 
This list, appearing at once comprehensive and motley, needs to be qualified by a 
countervailing list of caveats—offered by some of the same theorists—about the 
impossibility of teaching melodic invention itself. In other words, it was possible to 
articulate the elements of instrumental melodic form, and their functional 
relationships, but not their genesis as an aesthetic impulse. 
 
Mattheson (1737) simply declared such invention the province of Greek melopoeia, 
referencing the antique authority of Aristides Quintilianus without further 
explanation.68 Koch (1782) is widely echoed in referencing genius, supported by taste, 
as the arbiter of melodic judgment, the ability to determine: ‘if and how [the sections of 
a work’s inner composition] are beautiful in themselves and varied among one another. 
… To give rules for this,’ he continues, pre-empting Kant’s third critique, ‘according to 
which one judges the beauty and variety of the [melody], is actually not at all the object 
of the study of melody, in which we must only observe the outward form of the same.’69 
Philosopher Jean-Paul Richter reinforced this strategy of distancing inner impulse from 
outer form in 1802, arguing that each melody was its only manifest explanation, that all 
melodic theory could do was investigate the external structure of pre-existing models, 
where inner invention is glimpsed fleetingly through ‘genius of the instant’ driven by 
an inscrutable ‘blindness and security of instinct.’70 Reicha (1814), believing his to be 
the first genuine melodic treatise, reluctantly accepted prior readings of melody as ‘the 
fruit of genius,’ and cautioned ‘let no one assume that the aim of my work is to impart 
a genius for melody to those who do not possess it.’71 But he also offers defiance, 
arguing that the objects creating meaning from ‘a succession of tones’ are nothing but 
‘scales, intervals, modulations, various note values, the measure, cadences (or resting 
points), and rhythm.’72 Talent that engages these building blocks is more valuable then 
genius, he continues, for it can be cultivated through ‘assiduous, painstaking’ endeavor; 
genius without talent ‘amounts to little and often comes to nothing.’73 In this work 
ethic he is echoed by numerous later voices, Weber, Lobe and Marx, among them. 
 
																																																								
67 Schoenberg, Fundamentals of Musical Composition, 103; W. Jay Dowling, ‘Scale and Contour: The 
components of a theory of memory for melodies,’ Psychological Review 85 (1978): 341-54; Larry Polansky 
and Richard Bassein, ‘Possible and Impossible Melodies: Some Formal Aspects of Contour,’ Journal of 
Music Theory 36 (1992): 259-84. 
68 Mattheson, Kern melodischer Wissenschaft, 33. 
69 ‘[S]o ist es das Genie, vom Geschmack unterstüzt, welches diese Theile so erfindet und wählt, daß sie 
schön, und gegen einander gehalten mannigfaltig sind. Hierüber Regeln zu geben, nach welchen man die 
Schönheit und Mannigfaltigkeit derselben beurtheilt, ist eigentlich gar nicht der Gegenstand der Lehre 
von der Melodie, in welcher wir nur die äusserliche Form derselben betrachten müssen.’ H. C. Koch, 
Versuch einer Anleitung zur Komposition., 3 vols., (1782), 1: 12. 
70 “Eine Melodestik gibt der Ton- und der Dichtkunst nur der Genius des Augenblicks; was die 
Ästhetiker dazu liefern kann, ist selber Melodie. … [D]ie Oberherrschaft eines Organs und einer Kraft, z. 
B. in Mozart, wirkt alsdann mit der Blindheit und Sicherheit des Instinktes.” Jean Paul Richter, Vorschule 
der Aesthetik, ed. Norbert Miller (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1974), 25, 56.   
71 For centuries numerous treatises on harmony have been published, but not a single one on melody.’ 
Anton Reicha, Treatise on Melody, trans. Peter M. Landey (Hillsdale, NY: Pendragon, 2000), 1, 4. 
72 Reicha, Treatise on Melody, 9. 
73 Ibid., 6. 
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Turning from the perspectives of theory to criticism, the temperature rises without 
student readers to appease; at an extreme, melody conceived as an outpouring of the 
natural genius could achieve an untouchable status, beyond the reach of theory, and 
aggressively at odds with reformist aims of public education. To take just one example, 
the Wagner antagonist Eduard Sobolewski assumed an absolute stance in 1855: 
‘Melody cannot be taught … We may criticize it here and there, but we cannot improve 
it, or it is no melody.’74 Leaning on apparent ethnographic evidence, he relates the 
following tale as proof of concept: 
 
There lived in Dresden, when I was studying music there, a tall individual with … an expression 
of pain in his countenance, who desired to be a composer, and was only deficient in one thing—
melody. The poor man applied to many persons for advice, but no one could help him. 
Thereupon he continued to grow more and more melancholy, and, whenever a new composer 
came to Dresden, he would sell the last thing he had, pay a visit to him, and beg for lessons, 
under the impression that the stranger would be able to teach him what others could not. … 
Nothing, however, availed him.75   
   
Why the defensive stance, we may wonder? Where, for such a critic, is the desire for a 
‘ghost in the machine’ coming from?76  
 
One answer is that ‘melody’ is unwittingly presented in criticism as a totalizing 
phenomenon. This is not limited to the nineteenth century. ‘[M]usicologists have 
suffered from vertigo upon realising that melodic theory seems to dissolve into a theory 
of music as a whole,’ suggests Jean-Jacque Nattiez.77 To compose one requires a 
composite set of skills—inseparable from each other—in harmony, counterpoint, 
rhythm, control of texture, and expression. Theories of individual parameters excerpted 
from this holistic totality inevitably fail in the eyes of those seeking to understand their 
response to a replete musical texture conceived as melodic form. For present purposes, 





A case in point is Anton’s Reicha theory of melodic rhythm that sought to balance 
‘resting points’ and differing degrees of cadence within periodic forms. While he 
addresses matters such as contour, figure, patterning and rhetoric through fourteen 
‘principles’ (explicated by analogy with oratory), a metrical bedrock remains:     
 
The symmetry and unity of a good melody require that the second rhythm be similar to the 
first, that it be of equal length, and that the resting points be placed at equal intervals. … The 
period is thus the most important part of melody; rhythm and cadences exist in relation to the 
period; without the period, it is impossible for a good melody to be created. The composer of 
interesting periods is sure to overcome all difficulties in the art of melody.78 
	
																																																								
74 Eduard Sobelewski, “Reactionary Letters II,” The Musical World 33 (1855), 45. 
75 Sobelewski, “Reactionary Letters I,” The Musical World 33 (1855), 19. 
76 I refer to Gilbert Ryle’s classic description of Cartesian dualism from The Concept of Mind [1949] rpt. 
(London: Penguin, 2000), 17. 
77 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, ‘Melodia,’ Enciclopedia Einaudi, 15 vols. (Turin, 1979), 8: 1042-67, here 1047. 
78 Reicha, Treatise on Melody, 15-16. 
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Here, the creation of balanced melodic periods with a single figure (‘principle two’) 
demonstrates the maximum economy of pitch, resulting in ‘an interesting melody’ of 
just three notes: 
 
[Ex. 4 & 5 near here] 
 
Writing within a evolutionary mind set, psychologist Edmund Gurney would later 
identify the principle of rhythmic balance Reicha sought in melody as a human 
‘characteristic of dual balance’ that is basic to ‘the superior musical development of 
man.’79 As example 5 shows, Gurney illustrates this propensity towards melodies with 
even-numbered measures that alternate rhythmic patterns, a characteristic rooted ‘in 
the simple fact of our being made symmetrically with two sides externally alike, which 
results in alternate motions with each side.’80  To jump historical periods for a moment, 
the affinity between these examples and the minor-mode James Bond theme tune, 
resting principally on the rhythmically balanced repetition of scale degrees 1^ 2^ 3^ 
within a periodic structure, indicates that responses to such challenges easily transcend 
Reicha’s epoch.  
 
But François-Joseph Fétis, for one, found Reicha’s focus wanting. ‘The author has 
considered his topic in only one respect’ he chides, ‘that of rhythm and melodic 
phraseology … a good treatise on melody is yet to be written.’81 Proceeding to call for 
more inclusive theories, where ‘tonality, modulation, harmony and aesthetics’ would be 
addressed, his attitude exemplifies instances wherein any attempt to reify melody 
appears partial, and risks similar criticism.  
 
Beyond Fétis’ individual predilection for tonalité, this totalizing view of melody emerged 
from traditional practices of schooling composers in thorough bass and counterpoint 
alone (of which Schenker’s Kontrapunkt of 1922 appears perhaps the most extensive, 
late instance);82 here, as G. W. Fink argued, all that one needed to know about melody 
was to be found in principles of voice leading. Melody was not an exemplary object as 
such, i.e. autonomous and capable of imitation, but an inexplicable part of an overall 
musical fabric. A. B. Marx notably disagreed, arguing in 1841 that isolated training in 
separable compositional parameters—melody, form, rhythm, harmony—was needed for a 
new generation of composers.83  By 1911, a draft definition of melody by Ferruccio 
Busoni (for his aborted treatise on the topic) indicates just how multifaceted the 
																																																								
79 Edmund Gurney, The Power of Sound (London: Smith, E;der & Co., 1880), 132,  
80 Ibid., 134. 
81 François-Joseph Fétis, Biographie universelle (Paris, 1863). 7:203. 
82 Fétis concludes his 1844 treatise on harmony by asserting the universal governance of tonality as a 
principle: “I will say that tonality resides in the melodic and harmonic affinities of the notes in the scale, 
from which results the quality of necessity in their successions and aggregations.” In Complete Treatise on 
the Theory and Practice of Harmony, trans. Peter Landey (Hillsdale, NY: Pendragon, 2008), 246.  
83 In such a reading, it remains uncertain if general music theory should count as the substance of 
melody or as its ancillary support and regulation. His key statements, in opposition to Gottfried Wilhelm 
Fink, occur in Die alte Musiklehre im Streit in unserer Zeit (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1841); selected 
excerpts are translated in Musical Form in the Age of Beethoven, ed. and trans. Scott Burnham (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 17-34. The most comprehensive study of the Marx – Fink debate 
remains Kurt-Erich Eicke, Der Streit zwischen Adolf Bernhard Marx und Gottfried Wilhelm Fink um die 
Kompositionslehre (Regensburg: Gustav Bosse, 1966).   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concept had become, and hence how many aspects of composition would be drawn 
into a putative melodic theory. Written as a footnote in a letter to his wife, it is one of 
the most comprehensive definitions of his age: 
 
‘Footnote: Attempt at a definition of melody: a row of repeated (1) rising and falling (2) 
intervals, rhythmically (3) articulated and animated, containing latent harmony within it (4) and 
conveying an atmosphere or mood (5); that exists and can exist independently of words of text 
for expression (6), independent of accompanying voices as a form (7); and by whose 
performance the number of pitches (8) and instruments (9) bring about a shift in its essence.84 
 
Reflecting on the tension between melody as a special category and musical totality half 
a century later, Abraham and Dahlhaus seize on Busoni’s third and fourth points to 
declare the historical project of melodic theory a failure. ‘A theory of melody pedagogy,’ 
they asserted, ‘in order to avoid dry abstraction, must suspend or involve a theory of 
musical rhythm—a contributing factor to melody—and a theory of harmony (in the 
original, comprehensive sense of the term: i.e. a theory of the ordering of tones). It thus 
appears as a summary discipline, concluding the cycle of music theory.’85 The 
separability of melody from a musical texture remained an illusion for some in the late 
20th century, in other words, just as it had for Rameaueans in the mid-18th.  
 
Two cases in which theorists frame a progression from empty stave to composed 
melody serve to illustrate the skills gap between singular theory and summary 
discipline. Daube presented two “arias by Mozart” as empty staves in 1797, indicating 
only where melodic figures and their repetition should occur. While the fixed spatial 
arrangement guards against artificial complexity and enables the substitution of “many 
changes and figures” vis-à-vis Mozart’s unspecified originals, the remaining musical 
apparatus are glaringly absent.86 Likewise, in 1844, in order to demonstrate the 
formation of melodic ideas, J. C. Lobe reverse engineered the principal theme of  
Haydn’s symphony no. 104, leading from eight identical whole notes to progressive 
specification of melodic rhythm, its harmonic underpinning, and finally, its pitch 
content.87 Such contrived demonstrations implied that melodic composition was not 
limited to a monophonic line but, by definition, carried a whole musical texture, whose 
linear pitch content digested a comprehensive understanding of other compositional 
means.  
 
Unsurprisingly, some of the conceptual ambiguity spills over into terminology. Since 
the 18th century, the term melody was subsumed within syntactical categories of theme, 
idea, period, phrase. All imply the need for sensory unity, although inevitably, change 
in their usage is traceable. We have only to look at the 1st edition of Grove’s Dictionary 
																																																								
84 Busoni, ‘Uber Melodie: nachgelassene Skizzen’, ed. F. Schnapp Zeitschrift für Musik, 97 (1930): 95–101, 
here 97. 
85 “Denn eine Melodienehre muß, um nicht dürftig abstrakt zu bleiben, eine Theorie des musikalischen 
Rhythmus — der ein Teilmoment der Melodie ist — und eine “Harmonielehre” (im ursprünglichen 
umfassenden Sinne des Wortes: also eine Theorie der Tonordnung) voraussetzen oder einschließen. Sie 
erscheint demnach als zusammenfassende, den Zyklus der Musiktheorie abschließende Disziplin.”  Lars 
Ulrich Abraham and Carl Dahlhaus, MelodieLehre (Cologne: Hans Gerig, 1972), 11. 
86 Daube, Anleitung zur Erfindung der Melodie, 24. 
87 Johann Christian Lobe, Compositions-Lehre oder umfassende Theorie von der thematischen Arbeit und den 
modernen Instrumentalformen (Weimar: Bernhard Friedrich Voigt, 1844), 3-4. 
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(1875) where the aspiring English church composer, Charles Hubert Parry, sought to 
differentiate tune / air from melody, where the former is ‘constructively and definitely 
complete’ while the latter—perhaps influenced by Wagner’s conception of unendliche 




(2) Intervals: Towards a Scientific Paradigm 
Beyond theories of rhythm, for those who sought to study melody as an exemplary 
object, intervals and their character appeared to offer a means of objectifying melodic 
expression. Dyads sit at the intersection of harmony and melody as separable elements 
within a musical texture. They are the minimal diachronic units extractable from a 
melodic line, and can imply a determinable harmonic identity, even without vertical 
stacking. As such the various historical attempts to characterize intervals for the 
purpose of melodic pedagogy typically assume a harmonic context. 
 
In the early 20th century, the psychologist and comparative musicologist Carl Stumpf 
widened the remit of such enquiry by asking how humans first began to create 
transposable, fixed intervallic steps. He suggested two complementary impulses: (i) they 
took pleasure in the ‘fusion’ [Verschmelzung] effect of perfect consonances in our system, 
and valued the practical benefits of sending vocal signals further that such intervals 
afforded herdsmen; (ii) at the same time, humans used small incremental steps of equal 
distance from a given pitch to build stepwise pitch chains, which created the first 
transposable melodic motives. ‘If such songs with arbitrarily small steps were temporally 
prior, which is possible, indeed highly probable,’ Stumpf judged in 1909, ‘we would 
say: the secondary stream has a longer course but it does not hereby become the 
primary stream.’89 A cognitive-biological appreciation for perfect consonance is primal, 
he maintains, and while later psychologists have substantiated Stumpf’s position,90  
there was almost an organological premonition of his thesis in 1798, when one melodic 
theorist proposed the invention of an ‘octave violin,’ which would have had double 
strings tuned at different octaves to be played simultaneously in order to increase the 
sonority of melodic lines (fully a century before this became orthodoxy for Puccini’s 
moments of lyric climax).91 That octave-related double courses were long common in a 
range of non-melodic, plucked string instruments—lutes, vihuelas, baroque guitars—and 
could seamlessly be transferred to melodic instruments, arguably only underscores the 
relevance of Stumpf’s insight.    
	
Beyond the fundamental intervals, though, there appeared little means to rationalize 
other melodic steps. Theoretically, the intervallic organization of Greek tetrachords 
informed the sound of ‘melos’, but the concept of ‘melic composition’ underpinning it 
																																																								
88 Hubert Parry, “Melody” Grove’s Dictionary of Music and Musicians, 1st ed. (1875), rpt. 3th edn, ed. H. C. 
Colles (London: MacMillan and Co., 1929), 371.  
89 Carl Stumpf, The Origins of Music, trans. and ed. David Trippett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 49. 
90 See E. G. Schellenberg and S. E. Trehub, ‘Frequency ratios and the discrimination of pure tone 
sequences,’ Perception & Psychophysics 56 (1994): 472-478; and ibid., ‘Natural intervals in music: A 
perspective from infant listeners,’ Psychological Science 7 (1996): 272-277. 
91 Mollison, Melody: The Soul of Music, 81. 
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did not exist as a topic in its own right. Cleonides defines four musical categories—
genus, scale, tonos, and melos—and proceeds to explain types of modulation within 
each (where modulation in melic composition is a matter of switching from one ethos 
to another) as well as types of musical gesture in composition. But when it comes to 
melic composition per se, ‘it is disappointing that he has almost nothing to say,’ 
Thomas Mathiesen explains; it is merely ‘the use of everything described in the previous 
sections.’92 In one sense, this lacuna points to an anachronistic concept of 
composition—of organically piecing together disparate parts—that is not substantially 
part of Greek musical thought.  But it also asks a question of melodic structure that has 
proven unanswerable—‘How are melodic intervals meaningful?’—one that would dog 
later investigation.  
 
Returning to Mattheson’s treatise of 1737, his first chapter, ‘On the content of 
sounding intervals’ (Vom Verhalt der klingenden Intervalle), is devoted to outlining the 
array of all possible melodic intervals and their derivation, as ratios of each other, from 
the natural harmonic series. His synoptic illustration, reproduced as figure 2, makes 
clear his hierarchical elevation of harmony over linear dyad, which he later confirmed 
in no uncertain terms: ‘Melody is at root nothing but original, true and simple 
harmony itself, wherein all intervals follow successively, simultaneously and behind one 
another.’93 Within this reconciliation, however, he equivocates between relative 
harmonic and melodic significance within interval types, citing the augmented and 
diminished 6th as those that serve a more harmonic than melodic function, while the 
augmented 5th and 4th ‘are more common and useable that those above and serve 
melody and harmony equally.’94 This emphasis on the harmonic derivation of melodic 
intervals precedes his four species of ‘good’ melodic composition (‘simple, sweet, 
distinct, flowing’),95 their ‘rules,’ and genre-based discussions of melodic type; that is, 
the authority of a natural harmonic series precedes any consideration of style and taste.   
 
[FIGURE 2 near here] 
 
Several later theorists offered typologies of melodic intervals that went beyond appeals 
to Nature. Attempts to order tonal intervals according to degrees of emotional 
character, implied movement etc. reveal a tale of discrepancy, however, that 
undermines claims for a truth coherence. A. B. Marx, whose Die Kunst des Gesangs 
(1826) assigns each tonal interval an apparently inherent emotional character for 
listeners, was on the cusp of a sematic melodic theory even while his presentation 
makes clear that each interval presupposes a harmonic context and the effort of human 
breath.96 For philosopher Arthur Edwards one hundred and thirty years later, it is the 
perception of implied linear movement, or ‘degree of potential activity,’ rather than 
																																																								
92 Apollo’s Lyre, 389. 
93 ‘Die Melodie aber ist im Grunde nichts anders, als die ursprüngliche, wahre und einfache Harmonie 
selbst, darin alle Intervalle nach, auf und hintereinander folgen.’ Mattheson, Kern melodischer 
Wissenschaft, §6. 
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Harmonie, mit gutem Nutzen.’ Mattheson, Kern, 54. 
95 ‘leicht, lieblich, deutlich, fliessend’, Mattheson, Kern, 35-36. 
96 A. B. Marx, Die Kunst des Gesangs: Theoretisch – Praktisch (Berlin, 1826), 258-59. See also my discussion 
in Wagner’s Melodies, 58-60. 
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character that is the distinguishing feature; like Marx’s characterizations, this is sensed 








 Perfect fourth 
 Perfect sixth 
 Major sixth 
 Minor sixth 
 Major third 
 Minor third 
 Major second 
 Minor seventh 
 Diminished seventh 
 Diminished fifth  
 Augmented fourth  
 Minor second 
 Major seventh 
 






Historically, such claims to quantify emotional expression in melody generated 
significant debate, and to the extent they concerned the concept of ‘purely musical’ 
experience, they could be seen as attempting to answer questions motivated 
philosophically rather than musically. The restless quest for a stable basis for intervallic 
expression was thus a tributary in search of a river; and historiographically, it can be 
read as a blip against the more enduring epistemological basis provided by the overtone 
series.  
 
Helmholtz, writing in 1863, adjured an aesthetics devoid of reason in this sense. To 
contemplate lofty works of art, he argued, teaches us ‘to feel that even in the obscure 
depths of a healthy and harmoniously developed human mind … there slumbers a germ 
of order that is capable of rich intellectual cultivation.’98 As is well know, this germ, for 
him, was scrutable through empirical approaches to the auditory system’s physiology in 
relation to physical overtones.  Unlike Rameau, who rooted his theory of harmony in 
what is calculable with a monochord, Helmholtz regarded melody as ‘the essential basis 
																																																								
97 Arthur Edwards, The Art of Melody (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 151. 
98 Helmholtz, Sensations, 367. 
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of music.’99 As such he described himself as the first to draw empirically on auditory 
sensations to investigate the ‘real reason of the melodic relationship of two tones.’100 
His theory of melodic affinity identified the relational quality of two notes according to 
the perception of identical partial tones in the corresponding compound tones: ‘We 
shall consider musical tones to be related in the first degree which have two identical 
partial tones; and related in the second degree, when they are both related in the first 
degree to some third musical tone.’101  While first-degree relations accounted for perfect 
consonances, those of the second degree allowed for adjacent pitches in a diatonic scale 
to be related (his illustration was: c-d, related by the two partials each has in common 
with G). Pushing the aesthetic envelope, Helmholtz’s affinity theory led him to 
conclude that the major 6th and 3rd were the most beautiful intervals because the 
weakening overtone relations between their constituent pitches sit ‘at the limits of 
clearly intelligible intervals.’102  
 
Qualification and criticism of this brilliantly insightful, if seemingly straightforward, 
theory ensued. Helmholtz readily acknowledged the perception of overtones varies 
according to timbre, leading him to argue that our memory was crucial, that a listener’s 
recollection of overtone-rich pitches is associated with, and influences, how we hear 
overtone-poor pitches when we encounter them. But as Benjamin Steege reasons, the 
case of overtoneless melody in organ pipes nevertheless ‘emerged as a limit case for 
Helmholtz’s melodic theory.’103 Others, such as the contemporary American 
philosopher Xenos Clark, followed Darwin in arguing empirical approaches to the 
auditory system are not particular to humans, and that the ‘physical peculiarities of 
vibrating bodies [that existed] long before any living being came upon the earth, are 
also the basis of human and . . . extra- human melody.’104 Neither the empiricism of 
human particularity (trained ears) nor appeals to nature (ontic overtones) were 
impervious to critical revision in the debate over melodic intervals.   
 
With an acoustic epistemology, Paul Hindemith was effectively cultivating the furrow 
Helmholtz had ploughed when he ordered melodic intervals in his Series 2 according 
to the combination tones they produced (the difference between the frequencies of the 
directly struck notes), an order that balanced what he called harmonic and melodic 
‘force,’ as shown in figure 4. The relational ordering of all twelve chromatic pitches in 
Series 2 formed a structural device in his penultimate opera, Die Harmonie der Welt 
(1957), which allied concepts to keys based on the strength of their overtone relations 
to other keys (and allied concepts). It must count as one of the purest applications of 
Helmholtz’s melodic theory to composition: E [1] represents musica mundana, the 
																																																								
99 Ibid., vii. 
100 Ibid., 368. Others—including R. H. Lotze and E. Hanslick—had looked to nervous excitation, but 
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cosmic sonorities sought by the opera’s protagonist Johannes Kepler; B-flat [12] the 
forces most hostile to their attainment on earth.  
 
From a more abstract stance, Hindemith’s work highlights the way intervals pivot 
equivocally between ‘harmony’ and ‘melody’ in the conundrum we encountered earlier 
in Bach’s Prelude: ‘neither is strong enough to stand alone; each needs the other for its 
full unfolding … [N]o harmonic progression can be made except through melody—that 
is, by traversing the intervals. Harmony, on the other hand, connects and organizes the 
waves of melody.’105 Helmholtz’s scientific explanation of the same was characteristic:  
 
[W]hereas, however, in melodic relationship the equality of the upper partial tones can only be 
perceived by remembering the preceding compound tone, in harmonic relationships it is 
determined by immediate sensation, by the presence or absence of beats.106 
 
With this Helmholtz accounted for harmonic effect as the power of immediate 
sensation as opposed to a linear experience reliant on recollection and association, with 
all the cognitive distance this implies.  
 
[FIGURE 4: near here] 
 
We glimpse the contradictions between the above-mentioned approaches—aesthetic and 
scientific—when considering the harmonic tension or character of intervals that occur 
within a single chord. The postulate that ‘a rising melody always expresses and excites a 
growing intensity of feeling . . . whilst a falling one depicts a relaxation . . . from the 
climax of excitement’ as one critic summarized in 1849, does not apply when the 
intervals occur in a single chord, even in wide leaps, Hindemith explains: ‘the 
traversing of this space involves no effort, and it does not produce in the listener the 
feeling of expectation fulfilled that he gets when the leap is made to a non-chord 
tone.’107 Opinion was divided among earlier composers. A hundred and fifty years 
previously, William Crotch parroted Rameauian orthodoxy when he categorized 
‘essential and unessential [melodic] notes’ as those that ‘form a part of the harmony’ 
and those that do not, respectively; while Wagner, writing thirty-eight years later, 
suggested the ‘ineffectiveness of operatic melody hitherto’ resulted from the opposite: 
the failure to differentiate accompanimental harmony from vocal melody owing to their 
timbral dissimilarity.108 
 
Each approach testifies to the importance of comprehensible expression, which an 
atomized approach to dyads appeared to offer. Even into the 21st century, psychological 
research into the perception of intervals continues to pursue the goal of determinate 
expression, but with the caveat that only perceived, rather than innate, expressive values 
are obtainable. Alf Gabrielsson, building on such milestones as Meyer’s Emotion and 
Meaning in Music (1956) and Lehrdahl and Jackendorff’s Generative Theory of Tonal 
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Music (1983), appears to move little beyond the speculative verbal categories of early 
19th-century theorists when summarizing referential meanings perceived in different 
types of melodic motion:  
 
[S]ome results indicate that large intervals sound more powerful than small ones, the octave is 
perceived as positive and strong and the minor second as the most sad interval. … Stepwise 
motion may suggest dullness, intervallic leaps excitement; stepwise motion leading to melodic 
leaps may suggest peacefulness (Thompson and Robitaille 1992). Activity (sense of instability 
and motion) may be conveyed by a greater occurrence of minor seconds, tritones, and intervals 
larger then the octave. Potency (vigour and power) may be expressed by a greater occurrence of 
unisons and octaves (Costa et al. 2004).109  
 
The drive to quantify expression in this manner had met with incredulity when it was 
first suggested in the late 18th century, even from theorists hitherto content to bond 
music with rhetoric. J. A. P. Schulz, for one, poured cold water on the hope that 
individual intervals or characteristic figures (which, for contemporaries Daube and 
Riepel, formed the basis of melodic expression) could function as a kind of 
decipherable language of feelings. ‘It would be a ridiculous task to want to stipulate to 
the composer particular formulae or small melodic phrases that truly express every 
particular emotion, or even to say how he should invent such forms or phrases.’110 One 
reason, of course, would be that this presupposes a lexicon of ‘every particular 
emotion,’ for which composers would supply the musical counterpart. And the 
impossibility of itemizing the totality of human experience, specifically an alphabet of 
human thought, is precisely the reason the project of a universal language failed in the 
early 18th century after it had been promulgated by Descartes and Leibnitz et al.. 
 
Wholeness, Shape and Statistics 
What are we to make of these historical efforts and skepticism? One of the arguments 
made against atomizing melody into its constituent intervals is that ‘we do not first 
enjoy one sixth, and then wait and enjoy the next,’ as Gurney observed in 1880. ‘It is as 
impossible to pick out special intervals in a melody, and say they are more attractive 
than others, as to pick out a certain square inch in a beautiful face, and say the same of 
it.’111 Gurney’s argument that the beauty of an interval or square inch depends upon 
the whole to which it belongs has a long history. As an aesthetic principle, it dates back 
at least to Aristotle’s Poetics, while the perception of the wholeness of a melodic shape 
was obliquely defended in Rousseau’s theory of unité de mélodie, and formulated as a 
fully spatial (plastisch) aesthetics in Hegel’s words: ‘the meaning to be expressed in a 
musical theme is already exhausted in the theme.’112 In either case, the holistic concept 
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feeds into Gurney’s crowning principle of ‘ideal motion’ wherein the experience of 
melodic form and motion ‘are blended—where form is perceived by continuous advance 
along it.’113 The concept seeks to account for the paradox of perpetual movement 
within a fixed structure.  
 
Ironically, the notion of melodic wholeness received its most enduring theoretical 
treatment outside of music theory. In 1890, philosopher Christian von Ehrenfels found 
melody to be a good example of what he called ‘gestalt qualities,’ i.e. a mentally created 
shape. He pointed out that when a melody is transposed to a different key, it is heard as 
being identical to the original melody, even though the two are constituted from 
entirely different pitches. Thus, the perception of a melody is more than the perception 
of its individual parts, he proposed. A melody is, therefore, a gestalt quality.114 For 
Stumpf, building on Ehrenfels’ ideas, the ability to transpose a melody distinguishes 
human from avian musical faculties,115 though the practice of abstracting holistic form 
from constituent elements is demonstrable among primates, suggesting that a faculty of 
melodic transposition is merely undeveloped rather than absent in animals. When a 
dog recognizes its owner at different distances or in different lighting, for example, the 
visual stimuli received are different from those received when the owner stands directly 
in front of the dog. Hence the dog ‘has managed to separate the form mentally from 
the different circumstances.’116 The remaining question, for Stumpf, is why birds never 
transposed songs using the same faculty, after humans had so readily.  
 
Ongoing statistical research into preferences for melodic shape, pattern, or peak pitch 
indicates that the impulse to study pitch content empirically is unlikely to abate.  
One of the most comprehensive recent theories of melody as a note-to-note 
phenomenon is Eugene Narmour’s Implication-Realization model (1990 / 1992). 
‘Because science in the past century has demonstrated everywhere nature’s obedience to 
powerful yet parsimoniously structured laws,’ he explains, echoing Helmholtz: 
 
a similar kind of natural economy must govern the human perception of artworks. Thus, a few 
simple laws—perceptual-cognitive ones powerful enough to account both for the multiplicity of 
singular experiences and for the variation in perceived style—probably regulate the art of 
melody.117  
 
Specifically, contours become foreground structures of ‘implication and realization;’ the 
implication of continuation arises through the workings of Gestalt principles of 
likeness, proximity, or common direction where consecutive pitches lie relatively close 
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together. Two consecutive minor seconds establish a ‘process’ wherein we expect 
another small interval. That is, proximate pitches imply a continuing pitch direction 
and interval size. A large interval, by contract, implies differentiation, and hence a 
‘reversal’ of direction and size. A falling minor sixth would imply a small interval in the 
opposite direction, for instance. Namour identifies five melodic archetypes, of which 
‘process’ and ‘reversal’ are the first two. While this seeks to model musical experience 
itself, criticism of IR echoes Fétis’ complaint about Reicha, that of partiality or 
insufficiency: ‘the influence of meter and rhythm are neither clearly nor separately … 
delineated from the factors that Narmour purports to demonstrate govern note-to-note 
succession. … [Similarly,] the role of harmony in the theory remains ambiguous.’118 In 
Namour’s approach, sitting at the midpoint of notated pitches and their cognition as 
sound, the minimum individual structures of a melodic line must have at least three 
pitches, he explains; these are given letter symbols and combine to form anagram 
abbreviations of ongoing melodic processes. It is indicative of the taxonomic and 
combinatorial rationalism such a theory emotes that Narmour anticipates software 
using these symbol-string reductions to manipulate ‘large amounts of melodic data in 
“search and sort” operations. This has the potential,’ he continues, ‘for enabling critical 
analysts, style analysts, and ethnomusicologists to manage melodic data in new ways.’119 
 
Picking up this thread of optimism, David Huron asserts that ‘inferential statistical 
approaches [to melody] will help us generate and test much more refined hypotheses 
about the precise nature of compositional processes. What indeed are composers doing 
when they arrange notes on a page? Are they arranging pitches, or intervals, or scale 
degrees, or contours ... or some combination? A systematic statistical approach allows 
us to answer such questions.’120 The fruits of such confidence include Zohar Eitan’s 
combinatorial model of peak pitches in Haydn, Chopin and Berg, and Huron’s own 
investigation into melodic arches in folksongs using Humdrum Toolkit software to 
analyze the 6,251 melodies of the (mostly European) Essen Folksong Collection.121 The 
former argues that ‘an independent, nonsyntactic, gestural domain [exists] in music,’ 
exemplified in the pitch contour of melody, which Eitan posits as an embodied, 
primordial dimension of human utterance in general.122 Cross-stylistic analysis leads to 
the conclusion that:  
 
few features tend to be associated with peaks in all three repertories, and some are peculiar to 
one repertory (e.g. the tendency to avoid second-inversion chords at peaks in Haydn) … [A]n 
association with peaks with emphatic or intensifying features, is corroborated for two of the 
three repertories, Chopin and Berg.’123  
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In Huron’s study, each folk melody is coded for pitch and duration information, rests, 
bar lines, meter, and phrase markings. By quantifying melodies with a given number of 
pitches (5 to 15)—ignoring rests and interpreting tied notes as a single pitch—Huron was 
able to confirm a hypothesis that: ‘a disproportionate number of musical phrases and 
melodies tend to exhibit an arch-shaped pitch contour.’124 While these are based on 
average pitch contours within a melody-type of a fixed number of pitches, fewer than 
half of the melodies actually exhibited an arch shape in their contour, we learn. If we 
accept the ‘tendency for ascending and descending phrases to be linked together in 
pairs’ on the basis of such a study, this needs to be qualified by Huron’s own caveat 
against phrasal balance or maintaining tessitura: ‘What goes up is likely to come down, 
but what goes down is less likely to come back up,’ he summarizes.125 
 
To be sure, such empirical approaches are a far cry from the recessed creativity 
celebrated by Jean Paul in 1802, and we might say if aesthetics is the privileged method 
of appreciating 18th and 19th-century melodic composition, statistical sampling is the 
natural complement of algorithmic composition. Such tools as Dirk-Jan Povel’s Melody 
Generator (2010) or Dmitri Kartofelev and Jüri Engelbrecht’s ‘structured spontaneity’ 
(2013) use Markov chains or fractal geometry to create melodies based on restrictive 
programming of overtone properties and predefined stylistic parameters.126 This 
declarative approach to melodic data mirrors statistical analysis of the same, and the 
role of cognition recedes. Not all algorithmic approaches to melody work in such a 
directly automatic way, of course. Just as critic Eduard Kulke—fired by Darwin and 
Lamark—believed melodies were subject to evolutionary principles, and proposed 
genealogies of melodic transformations in 1884 as part of a collective cultural memory 
(of which example 6 offers an illustration from Beethoven), so Francesco Vico’s 
computer system Melomics (2010) uses an algorithm that mimics the process of natural 
selection. It first generates random musical fragments, mutates them, determines 
whether they conform to predefined rules (genre-specific, instrument-specific, stylistic). 
By this process, all fragments are incrementally refined into rule-adhering music. Under 
conditions of improvisation, such a process could not be entirely automated, of course. 
While evaluation criteria cannot be clearly stated in a programming language, 
Interactive Evolutionary Computation allows for interaction between the algorithm 
and human participant. One example is John Biles’ jazz melody generator GenJam, 
described as ‘a genetic algorithm-based model of a novice jazz musician learning to 
improvise’ in which a human mentor gives real-time feedback which is then absorbed 
by the program to improve the future generation of melodic patterns, i.e. in a closed-
loop feedback function.127  
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With historiographic spectacles, it is tempting to conclude that the concept ‘melody’ is 
perhaps only scrutable in a range of historically specific definitions where each 
approach reflects the precepts and theories of its context, a verdict that renders the 
concept hollow, a means for examining the intellectual environment rather than an 
object sui generis.  
 
The trouble with defending the ‘object’ theory is that approaches to melody are racked 
between the fixity of notation and phenomenological experience. Forms of notation, 
conceived as a closed system, offer ‘the completeness of the musical “text”’ in Jean-
Jacques Nattiez’s sense of what can be said to be immanent.128 This supports the 
comparative study of figures, metrical organization and intervals that proliferated in the 
late 18th and early 19th centuries. Yet a reception aesthetics, tracing individual responses 
to heard melodies, betrays an array of evaluations and their unpredictable psychology 
between and across cultures. At the end of his study of popular melody, Gino Stefani 
asks ‘[w]hy is melody truly popular? The answer is obvious now: because it is better 
suited than others for appropriation, in more ways, for more purposes.’129 This, for 
Stefani, includes singing, whistling, dancing or marching, and setting to words, all of 
which constitute forms of arrangement. Perhaps this law of appropriation explains why 
the postman, recalling an optimistic prediction of Webern’s, is not yet whistling his 
melodies. The retort, from an 1909 interview with Schoenberg, would be that ‘what a 
musician and what a non-musician can whistle back are already two very different 
things,’ an argument that leads him to qualify that the flipside of (appealing) simplicity 
is primitiveness: ‘it follows that our simplicity is different from that of our predecessors, 
that it is more complex, but also that even this complexity will in turn be regarded one 
day as primitive.’130  
 
As suggested above, he appears to have been wrong. The history of aesthetics teaches 
that on the one hand, listeners between the 18th and 20th centuries would expect, by 
degree, originality and expressivity of thought from a melody, while on the other hand 
a certain regularity of syntax. It is a paradox of restriction that pits convention against 
novelty. For the more ‘original’ a melody, the less it accords to codes of communication 
that are understood by reference to melodic precedents (over and above the existence of 
melodic archetypes). Tonal function and modal coherence provide a systematic context 
for generating a repository of precedents. And here it would be hard to disagree with 
Dahlhaus’ observation that ‘the harmonic structure of a melody can be thoroughly 
individual and unrepeatable, and this is not rare in the 19th century.’131 
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The conservative critic Carl Gollmick summarized what was at stake in 1839 when he 
wrote about melody’s capacity to excite or be ineffectual: ‘the more such successions of 
pitches [Tonfolge] are comprehensible, attractive and enduring to our ear, the more they 
deserve the name melody [Melodie]. Thus one says of compositions whose pitch successions 
lack these: they have no melody.’132 After the acerbic debates of the ensuing century, 
Busoni eyed the problem in historical terms as one of familiarity versus advancing 
technical means in composition. His statement sums up a certain frustration with 
attempts to specify what he called the material means of melodic expression:  
 
It has become a commonplace of music history that the appearance of every new composition is 
reproached for a lack of melody. This complaint greeted Don Giovanni on the occasion of its first 
performance in Berlin, Beethoven’s Violin Concerto, Wagner’s music dramas etc. etc. Again 
and again one sets rising technical ingenuity against decreasing melodic invention! It almost 
seems as though technical mastery can operate more through what is unfamiliar, melodic 
expression only through what is familiar. In fact, Mozart was a richer melodist than his 
forebears; Beethoven broader and more protean than Mozart; Wagner more sumptuous than 
Beethoven, if also less noble, less independent, more material; more of a character-smith, less of 
a psychologist.133   	
 
 
Busoni’s animating impulse for this complaint was the view that ‘immateriality is 
music’s very essence, which always resounds in a blossoming and sublime melody.’134   
Whereas voice was self-expressive, carrying the association of soul, pneuma, and hence 
of primary essence, instrumental sounds were not. So quantifying ‘expression’ for 
instrumental lines appeared plausible only in the context of alternative schemes of 
knowledge, such as figures and intervals.  
 
While calls to invest ‘meaning’ in the shaping or physiognomy of a melody have long 
since receded, Busoni’s call appears to be on the wrong side of history, for scrutiny of 
melodic ‘material’ has grown with growing computational means. From a genealogical 
perspective, aligning algorithmic composition with statistical analysis arguably 
highlights what is missing in ‘material,’ and latterly, computational approaches to 
melody: consciousness, that slippery term for organic agency that is self-aware. It may be 
no coincidence, then, that while certain theorists advocated states of unconsciousness 
when composing, melody has more commonly been adopted as a metaphor for 
consciousness itself. Witness Schopenhauer, for whom: 
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Only human beings, being endowed with reason, keep looking forwards and backwards over the 
course of their actual life as well as the countless possibilities, thereby achieving a life course 
that, in being thoughtful, is a coherent whole: -- correspondingly, only melody is joined up from 
beginning to end in a way that is full both of purpose and significance. As such, it narrates the 
story of the will as it is illuminated by thoughtfulness, the will whose imprint in reality is the 
sequence of its deeds.135 
 
 
In 1905 Edmund Husserl would sharpen this metaphor into a phenomenological 
insight. He locates reality not in the total sequence of deeds but in the ‘real now’ of 
immediate perception, which ‘becomes irreal again and again’ as time passes and 
present moments become past moments.136 The paradox that mental events ‘are in 
consciousness successively, but they fall within one and the same total act’ (22) of 
consciousness is exemplified in melody’s successive single pitches that give rise to an 
overall shape. Rather than overlaying discrete perceptual acts—pitches remembered, 
sensed ‘now,’ and anticipated—it is the mind’s capacity for simultaneous ‘primary 
consciousness, retention and protention’ (40) that allows it to comprehend dynamic 
totalities, whether life events or musical lines. That is, for Husserl, melody becomes an 
epistemological tool of the mind: a way of conceptualizing our understanding of the 
consciousness of time. In like vein, Henri Bergson (1910) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1936) 
both write of the unity of inner consciousness and ego, respectively, as a metaphysical 
melody.137 It seems reasonable to read this as a verdict—albeit an inconclusive one—on 
centuries of debate, in which self-awareness of epistemological schemes, from mimesis 
to the overtone relation of intervals, fall short of what was needed: an objective 
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